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Abstract: 
The effects of job-worker mismatches on job satisfaction are examined using the eight waves 
(1994-2001) of Spanish data taken from the European Community Household Panel (ECHP). 
The impacts of both educational and skill mismatches are estimated considering unobserved 
heterogeneity, state dependence and attrition bias. Dynamic analysis shows that skill 
mismatches emerge as a much better predictor of job satisfaction than educational mismatches 
as the effects of the latter are related to unobserved heterogeneity among workers. Moreover, 
the current level of job satisfaction appears to be influenced by workers’ previous job 
perceptions, suggesting a dynamic structure for job satisfaction.   
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Job-worker mismatches occur when the key requirements of a job are not accurately fulfilled by 
the characteristics of the worker that currently performs it. Education and skills are attributes 
that workers typically acquire at a cost and these are ranked against current job requirements to 
assess how accurate the match between a worker and his/her job is. Job-worker mismatches, in 
either education or skills, reflect inefficiencies in the allocation of resources in the economy, as 
workers’ investments in education or in skills development are not adequately used in the 
production system. As inefficiencies, job-worker mismatches are expected to have negative 
effects on the benefits workers obtain from their jobs. So far, research has focused on the wage 
effects of educational mismatches, whilst skill mismatches have received less attention. Indeed, 
a number of papers deal with educational and skill mismatches as equivalents in spite of 
evidence which shows that they are only weakly related (Allen & van der Velden, 2001; Di 
Prieto & Urwin, 2006; Green & McIntosh, 2007). Evidence of the consequences of educational 
mismatches on wages has shown that workers with a lower level of formal education than that 
required in their jobs (undereducated workers) usually earn higher wages than comparable 
workers who have the right level of education for the job (adequately educated workers), while 
those who have a higher level of education than that required (overeducated workers) face wage 
penalties (Verdugo & Verdugo, 1989; Sicherman, 1991; Alba-Ramírez, 1993; Bauer, 2002; 
Rubb, 2003; Frenette, 2004). Additionally, the rate of return to one year of overeducation is 
positive but lower than the return to one year of required education, while a year of 
undereducation usually has a negative rate of return (Duncan & Hoffman, 1981; Sloane, Battu, 
& Seaman, 1999; Daly, Büchel, & Duncan, 2000; Groot & Maassen van den Brink, 2000; Ng, 
2001; Groenelveld & Hartog, 2004). This implies that undereducated workers earn lower wages 
than their well-matched co-workers, while overeducated workers earn higher wages. Such 
analyses, however, only take into account the effects of educational mismatches on the 
pecuniary rewards from work, neglecting the fact that well-matched workers, either in terms of 
education or skills, are likely to reap additional benefits from jobs that are better suited to their 
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own preferences in diverse working aspects. Non-wage benefits linked to personal preferences 
may be derived from a variety of sources such as working in an attractive environment, 
performing creative or challenging tasks, holding responsibilities, and having greater work 
autonomy, better working hours or shorter commuting times, or even enjoying good 
relationships with subordinates, supervisors and co-workers (Vila, 2005). These non-pecuniary 
benefits from work represent true gains from a worker’s viewpoint and should be considered in 
the analysis of the consequences of job-worker mismatches.  
Job satisfaction provides a meaningful insight into total returns from work since it indicates 
how workers value the whole package of both pecuniary and non-pecuniary rewards according 
to their own expectations and personal preferences. Researchers have used survey responses on 
job satisfaction as proxy data for benefits from work, with job satisfaction being in turn a key 
determinant of well-being for working individuals. To date, most of the discussion surrounding 
this has focused on the effects of observable attributes of jobs and workers, such as wages, 
company size, trade union membership, age, race and gender (Sloane & Williams 1996; 
Watson, Storey, Wynarczyk, Kease, & Short, 1996; Hamermesh 2001; Blanchflower & Oswald 
2002). The analysis of job satisfaction can also be used to clarify the consequences of job-
worker mismatches on benefits from work. So far, however, the results have been inconclusive 
and rather limited.  Research on educational mismatches has found strong negative effects. Both 
overeducation (Tsang, Rumberger, & Levin, 1991; Battu, Belfield, & Sloane, 1999 and 2000; 
Johnson & Johnson, 2000) and undereducation (Hersch, 1991) have been reported to reduce 
workers’ job satisfaction. Additionally, analyses including both educational and skill 
mismatches conclude that workers with a higher level of skills (overskilled workers) and those 
with a lower level of skills (underskilled workers) than those required to carry out their job are 
less satisfied than workers with the right amount of skills (adequately skilled workers), while 
educational mismatches often show neutral effects (Allen & van der Velden, 1991; Green & 
Mcintosh, 1992). These results are typically reached by estimating ordered discrete choice 
models for a cross-section of data including job-worker mismatches as explanatory variables 
along with the standard determinants of job satisfaction (wages, current labour-market status, 
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education level and other controls). Nevertheless, the accuracy of such estimates depends on 
two crucial assumptions (Cameron & Trivedi, 2005) that are seldom tested in empirical research 
into job-worker mismatches. The first one is that workers’ characteristics, and more generally 
explanatory variables in the models for satisfaction, are not correlated with unobserved factors 
that also affect satisfaction. The second assumption is that a worker’s job satisfaction is not state 
dependent and, consequently, the current scores of job satisfaction are not influenced by 
previous experiences. If these assumptions do not hold, estimates of mismatch coefficients 
would capture a mixture of their true effects along with those of unobserved heterogeneity 
among workers plus those derived from the dynamics of job satisfaction.  
Longitudinal analysis based on panel data provides a more accurate estimate of the effects of 
educational and skill mismatches on work benefits by taking both the possibilities of state 
dependence and unobserved factors potentially correlated to explanatory variables into account. 
The use of longitudinal data, in turn, requires the examination of the attrition problem in the 
panel data. An attrition bias appears when participants either continue or stop responding to the 
questionnaire over time for non-ramdom reasons. This implies that the survival of an individual 
in the sample depends on his/her own personal and socioeconomic characteristics. Treatment of 
the attrition bias is important to guarantee consistent estimates of the impacts of mismatches on 
job satisfaction when using panel data.  
This paper intends to provide additional evidence on the effects of job-worker mismatches 
by estimating the influence of both educational and skill mismatches on subjective scores of job 
satisfaction using a panel of Spanish workers. Assuming that job satisfaction reflects the total 
benefits workers obtain from job-related sources, the empirical analysis addresses three main 
issues seldom considered in previous research on the effects of job-worker mismatches:   
(a) Total job-related returns to educational mismatches and skill mismatches may differ 
both in sign and amount.  




(c) The current level of job satisfaction may depend on previous levels of job satisfaction.  
 
The results of the analysis carried out show that job-worker skill mismatches reduced the 
level of job satisfaction even after controlling for unobserved heterogeneity among workers and 
state dependence. However, the effects of educational mismatches were only significant when 
unobserved heterogeneity was not taken into account, and disappeared when it was controlled 
for. This implies that educational mismatches are related to unobserved heterogeneity among 
workers. Additionally, the dynamic analysis suggests that workers’ perceptions of their jobs last 
over time as both the initial condition and state dependence are found to be significant 
determinants of the current level of job satisfaction.  
The rest of this article is organised as follows: section two describes the data set and 
selection of variables, section three discusses estimators for panel data and specifies the 
empirical models, section four presents the main findings, and section five details our 
conclusions. 
 
Data and Variables 
This paper uses Spanish data taken from the European Community Household Panel (ECHP) 
survey using all the eight available waves, from 1994 to 2001. This survey includes detailed 
information which allows us to examine and distinguish between the effects of both educational 
and skill mismatches on workers’ job satisfaction. A set of control variables related to the 
individual’s personal characteristics (gender, and marital status), human capital (educational 
level, job tenure, work experience, and quadratic work experience), and labour status (part-
time/full-time job, sector, natural logarithm of average hourly wage, unemployment episodes) 
were also considered. The sample used was restricted to wage-earners aged between 16 and 64 
who worked at least 15 hours per week in their main job. It excluded trainees, those working in 
unpaid jobs, those who either did not participate in the first wave or only took part in this one 
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and workers with missing values in some of the required variables. The sample thus contained 
15,685 valid records for analysis. 
‘Table 1 here’ 
Although Table 1 shows detailed information about variable definitions and sample 
descriptions, the procedure used to identify educational and skill matches was explored further. 
The so-called ‘modal’ procedure, proposed by Kiker, Santos and De Oliveira (1997), was used 
to identify the educational accuracy of the job-worker pairing. Under this criterion, the level of 
education required by a given job is defined as the modal education level among workers in jobs 
within the same occupational category1. Thus, a worker is adequately educated, overeducated or 
undereducated when his/her own level of education is, respectively, equal to, higher than, or 
lower than the modal educational level of workers in the same job category. The extent of a 
worker’s educational mismatch was determined by comparing the number of years of education 






The job-worker skill match was established using workers' self-assessments when answering 
the following two questions in the ECHP survey:  
(i) "Have your studies or your training provided you with the skills needed for your 
current type of work?" 
(ii) "Do you feel that your skills or personal capabilities would allow you to do a more 
demanding job than the one you do now?" 2 
‘Figure 1 here’  
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As Figure 1 shows, individuals who answered 'yes' to both questions were classified as 
overskilled workers because they had a surplus of skills for their current job. Workers who 
answered 'yes' to the first question and 'no' to the second one were classified as adequately 
skilled workers because they had enough skills for their current job, although they could not 
carry out a more demanding job. Respondents who answered ‘no’ to both questions were 
classified as underskilled workers because they did not have enough skills to do their current 
job. Finally, respondents who answered 'no' to the first question and ‘yes’ to the second one 
were classified as wrongly skilled workers because they did not have enough skills to carry out 
their current job yet felt they could perform well in a more demanding job, suggesting that their 
skills were wrong for their current job. Strictly speaking, wrongly skilled workers can be 
considered a special type of underskilled workers since they reported that their skills were not 
the right ones required to carry out their current jobs. This paper distinguish between wrongly 
skilled and underskilled workers when analysing job-satisfaction consequences.  
‘Table 2 here’ 
Table 2 shows that 29.5% of workers are overeducated, 38.4% adequately educated, and 
32% of workers are undereducated. Skill matches in the job-worker pairing show that 34.9% are 
overskilled workers, 24.8% are adequately skilled and 40.2% are underskilled, affecting the 
wrong skill endowment to 18.9% of workers. The bi-variate distribution of educational and skill 
matches in the job-worker pairing shows that only 35.1% of workers have the same kind of fit 
in their jobs under both classification criteria. This suggests that the relationship between 
educational and skill matches is weak, since if there had been a strong link between them, the 
percentages along the main diagonal of Table 2 would have added up to 100%. Furthermore, 
although Pearson’s χ2 allows us to reject the independence null hypothesis between educational 
and skill matches, the degree of association is low, as Cramer’s V takes the value of 0.06 on a 
scale from 0 (no association) to 1 (perfect association). These findings infer that both 
educational and skill mismatches are two very different labour market phenomena, and 
highlight the importance of examining the consequences on job satisfaction of these two kinds 
of job-worker mismatches, since most previous literature has either only examined the 
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consequences of educational mismatches or simply treated educational and skill mismatches as 
the same phenomenon. Furthermore, literature about the effects of job-worker mismatches on 
job satisfaction is rather scarce. 
 
Models 
The twofold aim of this piece of research is to show the importance of distinguishing and 
considering the consequences of both educational and skill mismatches on workers’ job 
satisfaction, and to highlight the importance of using accurate estimation mechanisms based on 
panel data. Thus, we firstly carried out a similar analysis to the research found in previous 
literature, using only cross-sectional data. We then examined the consequences of educational 
and skill mismatches using longitudinal analyses that took attrition bias, unobserved 
heterogeneity and state dependence into account.  
Using previous research into the consequences on workers’ job satisfaction as a result of 
educational and skill job-worker mismatches as a starting point, we estimated equation (1) using 
our data as a pool that does not exploit the longitudinal characteristics of the panel data. This 
job satisfaction specification can be written as: 
3                    (1) 
where  represents the explanatory variables related to educational and skill job-worker 
mismatches of individual i at time t;  contains a set of control variables associated to personal 
characteristics, human capital and labour status of worker i at time t;  is a time and 
individual-specific error term which is assumed to be normally distributed, and uncorrelated 
with the explanatory variables;  is a latent variable, since what is observed is an indicator 
variable in which the worker identified his/her degree of job satisfaction by means of an ordered 
scale from 1 (very dissatisfied) to 6 (completely satisfied) in each wave. This indicator variable 
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can be defined for each j alternative as , when  
and ,  ,  are the cut points.  
This specification of job satisfaction presupposes two strong assumptions (Cameron & 
Trivedi, 2005). The first one is that unobserved heterogeneity is not correlated with observed 
heterogeneity, which can lead to inconsistent or misleading estimates, and the second one is that 
workers’ job satisfaction has no inter-temporal dependence, and thus the current job satisfaction 
of a worker is not influenced by his/her own previous job perception. For this reason, we 
advance on previous literature by developing a longitudinal analysis of job satisfaction that 
takes unobserved heterogeneity among workers and state dependence into account. In order to 
highlight the importance of both factors, firstly a job satisfaction equation that controlled for 
unobserved heterogeneity was estimated and, secondly, a dynamic ordered probit model that 
took both unobserved heterogeneity and state dependence into account was estimated. These 
two job satisfaction specifications can be expressed as follow: 
             (2) 
             (3) 
where  is an individual-specific and time-invariant random component that involves the 
systematic unobserved heterogeneity associated to microeconomic data;  is the observed 
worker’s previous job satisfaction, which implies that the state dependence of individual i is 
taken into account;  and are time and individual-specific error terms which are assumed to 
be normally distributed and uncorrelated across individuals and waves, and uncorrelated with 
. The terms and  are assumed to be strictly exogenous.  
This paper models the unobserved individual effect  with a twofold aim. The first allows 
the observed explanatory variables to be correlated with the unobserved individual effect, as 
ignoring this correlation can lead to biased estimations (Hsiao, 2003). Thus, we parameterized 
the unobserved individual effect considering the within-individual means of the regressors, as 
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developed by Mundlak (1978). The second justification for parameterizing the unobserved 
individual effect was to address the problem of the initial condition (Heckman, 1981). Ignoring 
the latter amounts to assuming that the observations corresponding to the first time period are 
exogenous variables, which is untrue when the initial period of the survey is not the start of the 
process and the error process is not serially independent, a more likely situation in our case. In 
addition, ignoring initial conditions also implies that the marginal probabilities have reached a 
time-invariant value, which is not possible when some variables that vary with time, such as 
work experience and job tenure, have been included in the model. So, to address the initial 
conditions problem, the distribution of the unobserved effect is conditioned on the initial value 
of the dependent variable, as Wooldridge (2005) suggests. Thus, the individual-specific and 
time-invariant random component is parameterized as: 
                     (4) 
where  is considered to be independent of the  and  variables, the initial conditions and 
the error terms  and . 
So, substituting (4) in (2) and (3) the job satisfaction specifications have random effect 
structures that can be expressed as: 
(5) 
(6) 
Once parameterization of the unobserved heterogeneity was considered, we then had to 
determine whether equations (5) and (6) were to be estimated by random effect ordered probit 
or by pooled ordered probit estimators. This decision depended on whether there was attrition 
bias. Attrition bias appears when survey participants either continue or stop responding to the 
different survey waves for non-random reasons. This implies that the survival of an individual 
in the sample depends on his/her level of job satisfaction, job-worker match, and socioeconomic 
status among other factors. Thus, those who survive all the waves may be the workers who are 
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more satisfied, are better matched, and have a better socioeconomic status, etc. This is why not 
taking attrition bias into account can result in misleading conclusions. To test for attrition bias 
we used the tests proposed by Verbeek & Nijman (1992, p. 688), according to which the 
specifications of equations (5) and (6) are increased by including one of the following three 
variables: (i) a dummy variable that indicates whether or not the individual responds in the next 
wave; (ii) a dummy variable that shows whether or not the respondent answers all eight waves; 
(iii) a variable that indicates the number of waves a worker has been included in the panel. 
These provide three different attrition tests. If at least one of these three variables has a 
significant effect on workers’ job satisfaction, then there are significant systematic differences 
between those who do not answer and those who do, and therefore attrition bias cannot be ruled 
out (we have carried out the attrition tests using both random-effect ordered and pooled ordered 
probit models). In order to correct for attrition bias, inverse probability weighted (IPW) 
estimators (Robin, Rotnitzky, & Zhao, 1995; Fitzgerald, Gottschalk, & Moffitt, 1998; Moffitt, 
Fitzgerald, & Gottschalk, 1999; Wooldridge, 2002) can be used, but only with the pooled 
ordered probit estimator since these can only be applied to an objective function which is 
additive across observations (Contoyannis, Jones, & Rice, 2004) and so cannot be used in the 
log-likelihood function for the random effects specification4. It is worth noting that IPW pooled 
ordered probit estimator yields consistent (but inefficient) estimates for equations (5) and (6) 
even if the intra-individual correlation in the composite error term, , originating in is 
ignored. In fact, this procedure is the quasi-maximum likelihood (or partial maximum 
likelihood) estimator for the correctly specified model. As shown by Cameron and Trivedi 
(2005, p. 150), the consistency of quasi-maximum likelihood estimation does not require the 
correct specification of the joint density of the vector ; it is sufficient to 
correctly specify the marginal density of each of its elements . It is important to note, 
however, that the standard error estimates are not consistent, and therefore we use an estimator 
of the matrix of variances and covariances that is robust to the autocorrelation in the composite 
error term . 
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Two different types of IPW estimators can be considered. Both are obtained from binomial 
probit models, and more precisely from the estimated probability of response  of individual 
i in each wave t (t= 2,…,8). However, one of them depends on a set of variables5 that are valued 
as in the first wave (t=1), while the second type of IPW estimators depends on the same 
variables but these take the value of the previous wave (t-1). This implies that the latter IPW 
estimators are updated over time, and the interviewee never re-enters the panel. Nevertheless, as 
probability is estimated by the sample from the previous wave, they are not representative of the 
population that was originally sampled at t=1, and so do not provide a consistent estimator. 
Thus, the predicted probability of individual i at wave t  has to be adapted by using 
cumulative estimated probability, , (Wooldridge, 2002). 
On the other hand, as the coefficients estimated in the ordered discrete choice models only 
indicate the direction of the marginal effects on the extreme levels of the dependent variable, but 
do not show the magnitude or the direction of the marginal effects on the intermediate levels, 
the probability that a reference individual is more or less satisfied with his/her job has to be 
predicted, as well as the marginal effects associated with the main variables of the equation (6) 
in order to quantify the magnitude of the effect of job-worker mismatches after controlling for 
attrition bias, unobserved heterogeneity, and state dependence. Thus, the reference individual6 is 
adequately matched in his/her job, both in terms of education and in terms of skill, and the rest 
of the reference individual’s characteristics coincide with the mean of the population 
distribution for continuous variables and with the modal category for dummy variables. 
 
Results 
Table 3 presents the results from equation (1), which was estimated by means of a similar 
procedure to the one used in previous research which examined the job satisfaction 
consequences of both educational and skill mismatches, i.e. without exploiting the longitudinal 
characteristics of the panel data. The results show that both educational and skill mismatches 
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had a significant effect on worker’s job satisfaction. Estimates indicate that years of 
overeducation decreased the probability of job satisfaction, while the job-worker mismatch 
attributed to undereducation increased job satisfaction, which suggests that this was a good 
match from a worker’s viewpoint. On the other hand, all skill mismatches were perceived as 
unfavourable from a worker’s viewpoint, as they had a significant and negative influence on job 
satisfaction. As far as the other variables included in the model were concerned, we can 
highlight that the probability of greater job satisfaction was higher among those who worked in 
the public sector and among those with higher wages, while the probability decreased when a 
worker’s job tenure was under 11 years (the exception was job tenure of less than a year as this 
did not have a significant impact on worker’s job satisfaction). The effect of work experience on 
job satisfaction had a U shape, since this tended to decrease the probability of satisfaction until 
the length of work experience tended to increase job satisfaction. 
‘Table 3 here’ 
The above results were obtained without using the longitudinal characteristics of the Spanish 
panel data from the ECHP, so they do not take attrition bias, unobserved heterogeneity and state 
dependence into account, which implies that the results obtained from equation (1), as in 
previous literature examining both educational and skill job-worker mismatches, may be 
misleading. Therefore, could previous results be due to the influence of unobserved 
heterogeneity and state dependence in workers’ latent job satisfaction?  
To answer this, we firstly examined the likelihood of there being attrition bias in the panel 
data used. Table 4 presents the results of the attrition tests applied to the job satisfaction 
specifications in equations (5) and (6). The estimates were carried out using pooled ordered and 
random effect ordered models that took robust estimators of variance into account which 
allowed for intra-group correlation. The results indicated that significant correlation between 
workers’ job satisfaction and the response in the next wave depended on the job satisfaction 
specification and the estimation model. However, those who responded to all waves of the 
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survey were more likely to be completely satisfied with their job in all the estimated models, 
which implies that there is a significant positive correlation between permanence in the panel 
and workers’ job satisfaction, and that survival throughout the waves is not due to individuals’ 
random characteristics. The robustness of this finding is indicative of the problem of attrition 
bias in the data used to develop our analyses and corroborates the ECHP results obtained by 
Peracchi (2002). The problem of attrition bias led us to use IPW estimators so attrition could be 
treated as an ignorable non-response. As explained in the previous section, to obtain IPWs we 
estimated binomial probit models of response from individual i in each wave t by using 
regressor values from the first wave on the one hand, and regressor values from the previous 
wave on the other. However, the comparison of both estimates for each year using Akaike and 
Bayesian information criteria showed a clear preference for obtaining IPW estimators using the 
second method, as this makes the ignorability assumption more likely. This is why we used 
these estimators to weight the observations in estimating equations (5) and (6) by a pooled 
ordered probit model. 
‘Table 4 here’ 
Table 5 presents the estimations of equations (5) and (6) using robust estimators of variance 
that allowed for intra-group correlation. These show that after taking unobserved heterogeneity 
into account, most of the important determinants of job satisfaction found from estimating 
equation (1) lost their significance, which highlights the importance of taking the systematic 
unobserved individual effect into account. We also found that once the unobserved 
heterogeneity was considered, educational mismatches did not influence workers’ job 
satisfaction, while job-worker skill mismatches still had a very significant and negative impact 
on it. In addition, we found that workers’ job satisfaction for the first wave of the panel had a 
significant influence on their unobserved latent job satisfaction. This suggests that workers who 
were more satisfied with their jobs during the initial wave were more likely to still be satisfied, 
which suggests that any event that alters a worker’s job satisfaction has a long-term impact. On 
the other hand, the likelihood-ratio test indicates that the fit of the estimation of equation (5) 
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was worse than that of equation (6), since the former can be considered as a subset of the latter. 
We found that state dependence was a very important determinant of the degree of workers’ 
current job satisfaction. As a matter of fact, those who were more satisfied in their jobs in the 
previous period were more likely to still be satisfied with them at the moment, which again 
reinforces the notion that workers perceptions of their jobs tend to persist. Other significant 
determinants of workers’ job satisfaction after allowing for unobserved heterogeneity and state 
dependence were wages and job sector. Results show that those who had higher wages and 
those who worked in the public sector were more likely to be more satisfied with their jobs.  
‘Table 5 here’ 
Table 6 presents the marginal effects associated with job-worker mismatches and state 
dependence. This shows that in terms of skill mismatches, wrongly skilled workers were less 
likely to be satisfied with their jobs than those who were underskilled or overskilled. All of 
these groups were less likely to be satisfied with their jobs than adequately matched workers. 
Wrongly skilled workers were 4.4% less likely to be completely satisfied with their job than 
adequately matched workers. These percentages were 4.0% for underskilled workers and 3.1% 
for those who underutilized their skills in their jobs. Results show that state dependence had a 
huge positive impact on workers’ current job satisfaction. We found that if the previous degree 
of job satisfaction was 1 (very dissatisfied) and not 57 (very satisfied), the current likelihood of 
being completely satisfied with their job decreased by 9.8%. This drop was 5.7%, 5.6%, and 
3.0% respectively when the previous job satisfaction degree was, 2, 3 or 4 (not 5), while the 
probability of being completely satisfied increased by 8.1% when a worker’s previous job 
satisfaction was 6 and not 5. This also implies that a change in a worker’s current degree of job 
satisfaction will affect his/her future job perception. Therefore, a change from an accurate skill 
match situation to a skill mismatch one will have negative consequences on both a worker’s 
current level and long-term job satisfaction level. On the other hand, if the job changes from 
being a skill mismatch situation to an accurate skill match, a worker’s degree of job satisfaction 
will be positively affected beyond the moment in which the mentioned change happens. 
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‘Table 6 here’ 
 
Conclusions 
This paper belongs to the scarce body of research that examines the job satisfaction 
consequences of both educational and skill mismatches in the job-worker pairing. This analysis 
has allowed us to explore in greater depth how these two kinds of mismatches affect the value 
that workers give to the fulfilment of both pecuniary and non-pecuniary work expectations, and 
how job-worker mismatches influence the total benefit workers derive from their jobs. Using 
Spanish ECHP data from 1994 to 2001, we have shown the importance of examining the 
consequences of workers’ job satisfaction vis-à-vis skill mismatches, despite the fact that this 
has not been studied by most of previous literature which has mainly focused on the effects of 
education mismatch in job-worker pairings. On the other hand, we have demonstrated the 
importance of considering attrition bias, unobserved heterogeneity and state dependence, which 
were not allowed for in previous research on educational and skill mismatches in the job-worker 
pairing. 
The importance of considering educational and skill mismatches as two different phenomena 
in the labour market has been highlighted as a result of the weak relationship established 
between the two. Around 65% of workers have a different kind of fit under both classification 
criteria and Cramer’s V showed that its degree of association was 0.06 on a scale from 0 (no 
association) to 1 (perfect association). These findings show the need to differentiate and take 
both kinds of matches into account as two different labour market phenomena, although most 
previous literature has only focused on educational mismatches and often used educational 
mismatches as a way of examining skill mismatches. 
To analyse the relevance of attrition bias, unobserved heterogeneity and state dependence in 
the study of job satisfaction consequences as a result of educational and skill mismatches in job-
worker pairings, we firstly estimated their influence on workers’ job satisfaction without 
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exploiting the longitudinal characteristics of the panel data used. This analysis showed that both 
educational mismatches and skill mismatches were important determinants of workers’ job 
satisfaction, as were other variables such as work experience, job tenure, wages, job sector and 
unemployment episodes. However, once the attrition bias associated with the panel data was 
controlled, and the unobserved heterogeneity among workers was taken into account, the 
educational mismatch lost its significant effect on job satisfaction, as did most of the other 
aforementioned variables, whilst skill mismatches continued to have a negative effect on 
workers’ job satisfaction. This finding suggests that the influence of educational mismatches in 
job satisfaction when the data is a cross-section is misleading and a consequence of the 
relationship between educational mismatches and the unobserved time-invariant characteristics 
of individuals. However, mismatches in terms of skills matter to workers. In fact, those who are 
less likely to be satisfied in their jobs are those whose skills are not related to the kind of jobs 
they do (wrongly skilled workers), followed by those who feel that they are not able to do their 
job accurately because of a shortage of skills (underskilled workers) and by those who feel that 
their skills are underutilised (overskilled workers).  
We should also highlight that a change in a worker’s perception of his/her job will not only 
affect the total benefits workers obtain from work at the time it actually happens. In fact, we 
have found that both workers’ job satisfaction during the initial wave of panel data and their 
degree of job satisfaction from a previous wave have a very significant influence on workers’ 
current job satisfaction level, suggesting that events that either positively or negatively affect a 










1. The occupational classification used is the 1988 International Standard Classification of 
Occupations (ISCO88) to two-digit level.  
2. Vieira (2005) used the affirmative answer to this question to determine overskilled 
workers in the Portuguese labour market, even though some of the participants who answered 
‘yes’ may have had the wrong skills required to do their job. These workers are not overskilled. 
They do not have enough skills to do their current job and so are underskilled for it. Moreover, 
they are wrongly skilled. 
3. The first wave of data has not been utilised to consider the same individuals in the 
analyses developed in this paper, as it takes into account inter-temporal dependence using a 
dynamic model. 
4. The log-likelihood function of the random effects specification involves the product of the 
contribution of an individual’s observations for panel waves. 
5. The variables used are those included in  and  in equations (5) and (6), as well as 
workers’ self-assessment of his/her health status and his/her degree of job satisfaction. 
6. The reference individual is male, adequately matched in terms of both education and skills 
in his job, he is married, has worked in the same firm for over ten years, in a full-time job, in the 
private sector, his level of formal education corresponds to an International Standard 
Classification of Education (ISCED) level lower than 3, his degree of job satisfaction for the 
previous period and to the initial wave was 5, and his experience, hourly wage, unemployed 
episodes, and the continuous variables utilized to parameterize the unobserved heterogeneity 
take the mean value of the population distribution. 






Alba-Ramírez, A. (1993). Mismatch in the Spanish labor market: Overeducation?. Journal of 
Human Resources, 28(2), 259-278. 
Allen, J., & van der Velden, R. (2001). Educational mismatches versus skill mismatches: effects 
on wage, job satisfaction, and on-the-job search. Oxford Economic Paper, 53(3), 434-452. 
Battu, H., Belfield, C.R., & Sloane, P.J. (1999). Overeducation among Graduates: A cohort 
View. Education Economics, 7(1), 21-38. 
Battu, H., Belfield, C.R., & Sloane, P.J. (2000). How well can we measure graduate 
overeducation and its effects?. National Institute Economic Review, 171(1), 82-93. 
Bauer, T.K. (2002). Educational mismatch and wages: A panel analysis. Economics of 
Education Review, 21(3), 221-229. 
Blanchflower, D.G., & Oswald, A.J. (2004). Well-being over time in Britain and the USA. 
Journal of Public Economic, 88(7-8), 1359-1386. 
Cameron, A.D., & Trivedi, P.K. (2005). Microeconometrics. Methods and applications. New 
York: Cambridge University Press. 
Contoyannis, P., Jones, A.M., & Rice, N. (2004). The dynamics of health in the British 
household panel survey. Journal of Applied Econometrics, 19, 473-503. 
Daly, M.C., Büchel, F., & Duncan, G.J. (2000). Premiums and penalties for surplus and deficit 
education, evidence from the United States and Germany. Economics of Education 
Review, 19(2), 169-178. 
Di Pietro, G., & Urwin, P. (2006). Education and skills mismatch in the Italian graduate labor 
market. Applied Economics, 38(1), 79-93. 
20 
 
Duncan, G., & Hoffman, S.D. (1981). The Incidence and wage effects of overeducation. 
Economics of Education Review, 1(1), 75-86. 
Fitzgerald, J., Gottschalk, P., & Moffitt, R. (1998). An analysis of sample attrition in panel data. 
The Michigan Panel Study on Income Dynamics. Journal of Human Resources, 33(2), 251-
299. 
Frenette, M. (2004). The overqualified Canadian graduate: The role of the academic program in 
the incidence, persistence, and economic return to overqualification. Economics of 
Education Review, 23(1), 29-45. 
Green, F., & McIntosh, S. (2002). Is there a genuine underutilization of skills amongst the over-
qualified?. SKOPE Research Paper 30.  
Green, F., & McIntosh, S. (2007). Is there a genuine underutilization of skills amongst the over-
qualified?. Applied Economics, 39(4), 427-439. 
Groeneveld, S., & Hartog, J. (2004). Overeducation, wages and promotions within the firm. 
Labor Economics, 11(6), 701-714. 
Groot, W., & Maassen van den Brink, H. (2000). Skill mismatches in the Dutch labor market. 
International Journal of Manpower, 21(8), 584-595. 
Hamermesh, D.S. (2001). The changing distribution of job satisfaction. Journal of Human 
Resources, 36(1), 1-30. 
Heckman, J. (1981). The incidental parameters problem and the problem of initial conditions in 
estimating a discrete time-discrete data stochastic process. In C.F. Manski, & McFadden, D. 
(Eds.), Structural analysis of discrete data with econometric applications. Cambridge, MA: 
MIT Press. 
Hersch, J. (1991). Education match and job match. Review of Economics and Statistics, 73(1), 
140-144. 
Hsiao, C. (2003). Analysis of panel data. Cambridge: University press. 
21 
 
Johnson, G.J., & Johnson, W.R. (2000). Perceived overqualification and dimensions of job 
satisfaction: A longitudinal analysis. Journal of Psychology, 134(5), 537-555. 
Kiker, B.F., Santos, M.C., & De Oliveira, M.M. (1997). Overeducation and undereducation: 
evidence for Portugal. Economics of Education Review, 16(2), 111-125. 
Moffitt, R., Fitzgerald, J., & Gottschalk, P. (1999). Sample attrition in panel data: The role of 
selection observables. Annales d’Economie et de Statistique, 55-56, 129-152. 
Mundlak, Y. (1978). On the pooling of time series and cross-section data. Econometrica, 46(1), 
69-85. 
Ng, Y.C. (2001). Overeducation and undereducation and their effect on earnings: Evidence from 
Hong Kong, 1986-1996. Pacific Economic Review, 6(3), 401-418.  
Peracchi, F. (2002). The European Commnunity household panel: A review. Empirical 
Economics, 27(1), 63-90. 
Robins, J, Rotnitzky, A., & Zhao, L.P. (1995). Analysis of semiparametric regression models 
for repeated outcomes in the presence of missing data. Journal of the American Statistical 
Association, 90(429), 106-121. 
Rubb, S. (2003). Post-college schooling, overeducation, and hourly earnings in the United 
States. Education Economics, 11(1), 53-72. 
Sicherman, N. (1991). Overeducation in the Labor Market. Journal of Labor Economics, 9(2), 
101-122. 
Sloane, P.J., Battu, H., & Seaman, P.T. (1999). Overeducation, undereducation and the British 
labor market. Applied Economics, 31(11), 1437-1453. 
Sloane, P.J., & Williams, H. (1996). Are overpaid workers really unhappy? A test of the theory 
of cognitive dissonance. Labour, 10, 3-15. 
22 
 
Tsang, M.C., Rumberger, R.W., & Levin, H.M. (1991). The Impact of Surplus Schooling on 
Worker Productivity. Industrial Relations, 30(2), 209-228. 
Verbeek, M., & Nijman, T.E. (1992). Testing for selectivity bias in panel data models. 
International Econometric Review, 33(3), 681-703. 
Verdugo, R.R., & Verdugo, N.T. (1989). The impact of surplus schooling on earnings: some 
additional findings. Journal of Human Resources, 24(4), 629-643. 
Vieira, J.A.C. (2005). Skill mismatches and job satisfaction. Economics Letters, 89(1), 39-47. 
Vila, L.E. (2005). The outcomes of investment in education and people’s well-being. European 
Journal of Education, 40(1), 3-11. 
Watson, R., Storey, D., Wynarczyk, P., Keasey, K., & Short, H. (1996). The relationship 
between job satisfaction and managerial remuneration in small and medium-sized 
enterprises: an empirical test of comparison income and equity theory hypotheses. Applied 
Economics, 28(5), 567-576. 
Wooldridge, J.M. (2002). Econometric analysis of cross-section and panel data. Cambridge, 
MA: The MIT Press. 
Wooldridge, J.M. (2005). Simple solutions to the initial conditions problem in dynamic, 
nonlinear panel data models with unobserved heterogeneity. Journal of Applied 










Tables and Figures 
Variable definition Mean Std. Dev.
Job satisfaction Ordered variable from 1 (very dissatisfied) to 6 (completely satisfied) 4.36 1.20
Personal characteristics
Woman It takes value 1 if woman, and 0 otherwise 0.32 0.47
Separated & divorced It takes value 1 if separated or divorced, and 0 otherwise 0.03 0.18
Single It takes value 1 if single, and 0 otherwise 0.20 0.40
Human capital
Work Experience Potencial work experience = Age - Schooling years - 6 25.90 11.21
Quadratic work experience/100 (Potencial work experience)2/100 7.96 6.45
Tenure < 1 yr. It takes value 1 if job tenure is lower than 1 year, 0 otherwise 0.07 0.26
Tenure: 1 - 5 yrs. It takes value 1 if job tenure is between 1 to 5 years, 0 otherwise 0.21 0.41
Tenure: 6 - 10 yrs. It takes value 1 if job tenure is between 6 to 10 years, 0 otherwise 0.18 0.38
ISCEDa 3 It takes value 1 if level 3 of ISCEDa, 0 otherwise 0.21 0.41
ISCED 5-6, and doctorate It takes value 1 if level 5 or 6 of ISCED  or doctorate, 0 otherwise 0.23 0.42
Labour status
Ln(wage) Natural logarithm of hourly wage deflacted by Consummer Price Index 1.51 0.55
Part-timer job It takes value 1 if part-timer job, and 0 otherwise 0.03 0.18
Public sector job It takes value 1 if public sector job, and 0 otherwise 0.32 0.47
Unemployment episodes Number of unmployment episodes in the last five years 0.54 1.42
Job-worker mismatches
Overskilled It takes value 1 if overskilled worker, and 0 otherwise 0.35 0.48
Underskilled It takes value 1 if underskilled worker, and 0 otherwise 0.21 0.41
Wrongly skilled It takes value 1 if wrongly skilled worker, and 0 otherwise 0.19 0.39
Yrs. Overeducation Years of overeducation 1.11 2.05
Yrs. Undereducation Years of undereducation 1.08 1.87
a. International Standard Classification of Education.
Variable
Table 1
































Overskilled 12.0 12.9 10.0 34.9
Adequately skilled 6.1 9.9 8.9 24.9
Underskilleda 11.4 15.6 13.2 40.2















Separated & divorced -0.015 0.080
Single -0.007 0.034
Work Experience -0.019 *** 0.005
Quadratic work experience/100 0.032 *** 0.009
Tenure < 1 yr. -0.023 0.050
Tenure: 1 - 5 yrs. -0.080 *** 0.037
Tenure: 6 - 10 yrs. -0.074 *** 0.033
ISCED 3 -0.056 0.035
ISCED 5-6, and doctorate -0.030 0.042
Ln(wage) 0.279 *** 0.029
Part-timer job -0.103 0.070
Public sector job 0.147 *** 0.029
Unemployment episodes -0.020 *** 0.010
Yrs. Overeducation -0.011 * 0.006
Yrs. Undereducation 0.018 *** 0.006
Overskilled -0.169 *** 0.025
Underskilled -0.275 *** 0.030
Wrongly skilled -0.389 *** 0.031
Cut 1 -2.065 0.103
Cut 2 -1.493 0.101
Cut 3 -0.821 0.101
Cut 4 -0.102 0.100





Estimation Results for Job Satisfaction. Equation (1)
Ordered probit
















Next wave 0.056**   0.027 0.061**   0.026 0.024       0.025 0.060**   0.026
All waves 0.071*** 0.025 0.076*** 0.029 0.059*** 0.021 0.070*** 0.026
Number of waves 0.008        0.006 0.006       0.007 0.007        0.006 0.007       0.007
*p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.001
Table 4








Woman 0.043 0.038 0.038 0.031
Separated & divorced -0.025 0.160 -0.035 0.146
Single -0.129 0.105 -0.137 0.097
Work Experience 0.011 0.018 0.006 0.017
Quadratic work experience/100 -0.059 * 0.032 -0.041 0.029
Tenure < 1 yr. 0.119 0.095 0.146 0.095
Tenure: 1 - 5 yrs. 0.071 0.078 0.043 0.075
Tenure: 6 - 10 yrs. -0.081 0.059 -0.092 0.058
ISCED 3 0.049 0.097 0.026 0.099
ISCED 5-6, and doctorate -0.160 0.156 -0.105 0.150
Ln(wage) 0.168 *** 0.053 0.137 *** 0.052
Part-timer job -0.044 0.149 -0.011 0.131
Public sector job 0.149 * 0.076 0.154 ** 0.073
Unemployment episodes -0.120 0.160 -0.133 0.144
Yrs. Overeducation -0.005 0.009 -0.004 0.008
Yrs. Undereducation 0.004 0.010 0.004 0.010
Overskilled -0.126 *** 0.034 -0.118 *** 0.035
Underskilled -0.133 *** 0.044 -0.155 *** 0.046
Wrongly skilled -0.186 *** 0.045 -0.175 *** 0.046
Satisfaction in wave=1: degree 1 -0.719 *** 0.110 -0.441 *** 0.093
Satisfaction in wave=1: degree 2 -0.416 *** 0.079 -0.234 *** 0.063
Satisfaction in wave=1: degree 3 -0.384 *** 0.047 -0.226 *** 0.041
Satisfaction in wave=1: degree 4 -0.193 *** 0.042 -0.116 *** 0.035
Satisfaction in wave=1: degree 6 0.376 *** 0.047 0.265 *** 0.040
Satisfaction in t-1: degree 1 -0.890 *** 0.088
Satisfaction in t-1: degree 2 -0.704 *** 0.062
Satisfaction in t-1: degree 3 -0.490 *** 0.043
Satisfaction in t-1: degree 4 -0.257 *** 0.030
Satisfaction in t-1: degree 6 0.308 *** 0.036
Cut 1 -2.344 0.157 -2.527 0.133
Cut 2 -1.744 0.158 -1.897 0.133
Cut 3 -1.011 0.158 -1.131 0.133
Cut 4 -0.266 0.158 -0.357 0.132
Cut 5 0.919 0.158 0.863 0.132
Log likelihood
N
Likelihood-ratio test  (equations (5) and (6)): Chi-squared = 864.08   P-value = 0.000
Table 5
Estimations Resultsa of Job Satisfaction. Equations (5) and (6) Using IPWb
Dynamic ordered probit with 
unobserved heterogeneity
 Coefficients  Robust 
Std. Error
Ordered probit with unobserved 
heterogeneity
 Coefficients  Robust 
Std. Error
b. Inverse probability weights estimated by using observed values of previous wave.
a. Coefficients for the regressors of the within-individual means available on request.











Overskilled 0.002 (0.001) 0.006 (0.002) 0.018 (0.005) 0.018 (0.006) ‐0.014 (0.005) ‐0.031 (0.009)
Underskilled 0.003 (0.001) 0.009 (0.003) 0.024 (0.007) 0.024 (0.007) ‐0.020 (0.008) ‐0.040 (0.012)
Wrongly skilled 0.004 (0.001) 0.010 (0.003) 0.027 (0.007) 0.027 (0.007) ‐0.023 (0.008) ‐0.044 (0.012)
Satisfaction in t-1: degree 1 0.013 (0.005) 0.031 (0.009) 0.072 (0.016) 0.057 (0.010) ‐0.075 (0.023) ‐0.098 (0.018)
Satisfaction in t-1: degree 2 0.005 (0.002) 0.014 (0.005) 0.037 (0.011) 0.035 (0.009) ‐0.033 (0.012) ‐0.057 (0.015)
Satisfaction in t-1: degree 3 0.005 (0.001) 0.014 (0.003) 0.035 (0.007) 0.034 (0.006) ‐0.032 (0.009) ‐0.056 (0.010)
Satisfaction in t-1: degree 4 0.002 (0.001) 0.006 (0.002) 0.017 (0.005) 0.018 (0.005) ‐0.014 (0.006) ‐0.030 (0.009)
Satisfaction in t-1: degree 6 ‐0.003 (0.001) ‐0.011 (0.002) ‐0.034 (0.006) ‐0.046 (0.007) 0.013 (0.008) 0.081 (0.013)
Table 6
Predicted Probability Distribution of Job Satisfaction for a Reference Individuala and Marginal Effectsb. 
Equation (6) with IPWc Estimators
Job satisfaction degree
0.232 0.445 0.193
1 2 3 4 5 6
0.006 0.023 0.101
a. The reference individual is male, adequately matched in terms of both education and skills in his job; he is married, has worked in
the same company for over ten years in a full-time job within the private sector. His level of formal education corresponds to a level of
International Classification of Education (ICSED) lower than 3 and the job satisfaction degree corresponding to the previous period
and to the initial wave is 5. His experience, hourly wage, unemployed episodes and the continuous variables utilised to parameterize
the unobserved heterogeneity take the mean value of the population distribution.
b. The marginal effects of the dummy variables show the discrete change from 0 to 1. The robust estandard error is in brakets.
n.s. indicates no significant effect.
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